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SOLIDARITY IN THE LEGAL FRAMES1 
– Aleksandra Głos –
Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to explore the meaning of solidarity and its proper position 
in the legal frames, with particular focus on health care. Solidarity is often identified with welfare 
arrangements and social guarantees. In this institutional version, it tends to humiliate citizens and 
restrict their entrepreneurship. Moreover, administrative solidarity is unable to recognize the ac-
tual needs of the most vulnerable members of society, which should be one of its primary concerns. 
Solidarity, in its original meaning, understood as supportive cooperation of fellow citizens, links 
their rights and freedoms with mutual duties and responsibilities. Hence, an alternative framework 
for solidarity should be provided. This framework, committed to the idea of decency, intro-
duces the distinction between the minimum and maximum content of solidarity enforceable by 
legal means, which should be translated into certain health care practices. 
Keywords: solidarity, health care, responsibility, welfare state, legal framing, decent care, R. Ter 
Meulen, A. Margalit. H. Frankfurt. 
I. Preliminary remarks 
Perhaps the sole universally acknowledged truth about solidarity is the lack 
of consensus regarding its meaning. K. Bayertz2 accurately described this as the 
common fate of many prime terms in political and social theory, such as “justice,” 
“equality” and “liberty;” contrary to these, however, the ambiguity about solidar-
ity does not result from an abundance of theories. Solidarity, very popular as 
a slogan or a catchword, has been widely neglected in social theory. 
Even if indeterminacy can be an asset sometimes, this is not the case for 
solidarity. Its ambiguity is used to justify contradictory theses (for example, so- 
-called constitutive solidarity serves as an argument justifying the usage of genetic 
information in actuarial calculations, while communal solidarity stands for an ar-
gument against it).3 Presumably, it is no accident that the controversies about this 
idea go along with a general crisis of solidarity in Western societies. As words 
1 The article was written as part of the “Justice in health care” research project (No. 
2013/08/A/HS1/00079), financed by the National Science Centre. 
2 Bayertz [1999] p. 3. 
3 Cf. Husted [1999]. 
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have their performative (or in the language of I. Kant – “regulative”) power, the 
restoration of solidarity in the social and political realms should begin with a re-
flection on its meaning. 
The main goal of this paper is, therefore, to explore the meaning of solidar-
ity. In order to indicate the semantic boundaries of this concept, I will use a com-
mon language analysis and examine the most interesting accounts of solidarity in 
contemporary philosophy. As it is not possible to understand solidarity outside 
the legal and political context, I will then discuss its appropriate role within the 
state. This cannot be accomplished without reflecting on the relation between soli-
darity and other fundamental concepts of social theory: decency and justice. All 
these reflections are accompanied by an underlying conviction that solidarity is 
connected not only with rights and claims, but also with the dimension of duty 
and possibility. 
II. What is solidarity? 
The Oxford Dictionaries define solidarity as “unity or agreement of feeling 
or action, especially among individuals with a common interest; mutual support 
within a group.”4 The second entry, and at the same time a suggestive historical 
illustration of the given meaning, provides another definition: “an independent 
trade union movement in Poland which developed into a mass campaign for po-
litical change and inspired popular opposition to Communist regimes across east-
ern Europe.”5 Indeed, the context of a trade union and its struggle for decent 
treatment seems most illustrative in understanding solidarity. It exposes its intrin-
sic relation with freedom and decency, as well as its private-public character – 
solidarity is a form of a bottom-up organization (in Aristotle’s words, a form of 
civic friendship) which must gain expression within the frames of state. As such, it 
encompasses two dimensions: affective “communality of feelings” and readiness 
to support,6 as well as a “community of responsibilities and interests.” 
1. SOLIDARITY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
The Oxford Dictionaries derive the word from 18th-century French solidarité. 
It is beyond doubt that we owe to the French Revolution the unfailing popularity 
of the slogan “liberty, equality, fraternity” and, therefore, the prominence of the 
concept of solidarity. Not searching further for the origin of this concept would 
however be short-sighted. 
                                                 
4 Oxford dictionaries: http://www.oxforddictionary.com/definition/english/solidarity. 
5 Ibidem. 
6 Dictionary.com: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/solidarity. 
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This revolutionary context seems so obvious that we tend to forget about 
the roots of solidarity which are deeper and qualitatively different – not political 
and romantic, but strictly legal. In Roman law, a “solidary” obligation, from 
“solidus” (solid) referred to the firmest form of cooperation. Obligatio in solidum 
meant joint liability – a form of partnership where everyone was responsible for 
the entire obligation: in the case of insolvency of one partner, the other partners 
were obligated to pay the whole debt (all for one, one for all); free riding was thus 
ruled out by legal means. 
 What is needed for us to assume such a great responsibility? All dictionary 
definitions mention two necessary elements: the cognitive element (community of 
interest) and the affective element (community of feelings). Neither of them 
should be overestimated. It is obvious that all fiduciary relations require mutual 
trust (fides), which in the case of obligatio in solidum must be particularly deep. This 
kind of absolute trust may imply relations closer than only professional, resem-
bling family bonds or ties of friendship (after all, it is not accidental that “frater-
nity” is a synonym of solidarity). However, this family context (and, therefore, the 
affective element of solidarity) should not be extended too far. Solidarity is a rela-
tionship qualitatively different from friendship or familiarity, as it functions in the 
public sphere. We do not need to reflect on the necessary conditions of solidarity 
of strangers (as J. Dean7 and many others do) because solidarity as civic friendship 
is ex definitione a relation of unity and agreement despite diversity and, as such, it 
presupposes a certain amount of distance and formality. Private rhetoric, which 
tends to stress only the affective dimension of solidarity, contributes to the trans-
formation of the formal idea of supportive cooperation, which lies at the heart of 
solidarity, into a moral call for charity. 
2. SOLIDARITY AS SUPPORTIVE COOPERATION 
For sure, reducing solidarity to charity violates the original symmetry be-
tween the members of a solidary association. The most important objection to 
charity is its asymmetrical nature: the beneficiary bears the burden of pity, while 
the benefactor reaches the heights of virtue (and pride). This distorted, 
Nietzschean account of charity is well-known and widely repeated, but not neces-
sarily true. It can be argued that the emotional basis of charity is not asymmetri-
cally conceived pity, but symmetrical compassion: do I feel uncomfortable facing 
your suffering or, rather, do I suffer with you? In Kant’s purely rational terms, we 
would say that observing an abuse of dignity of another human being abuses hu-
                                                 
7 Dean [1996]. 
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man dignity in oneself. In terms of contemporary neurobiology, we would refer to 
mirror neurons which reflect the suffering of the other as if the observer suffered 
himself.8 Obviously, this does not eliminate a certain asymmetry involved in the 
situation of helping someone who is weak by someone who is powerful enough to 
do it, nor does it prevent the feeling of indebtedness (even if it is “only” a debt of 
gratitude). It does, however, mitigate discomfort of this asymmetry and refute “re-
sentment objection.” 
The act of thus-conceived compassionate assistance is a part of a solidary 
enterprise. The dictionary definition quoted above mentions “mutual support 
within a group” and we know from our experience that such support was pro-
vided among solidary workers and partners in a joint venture. We also appeal to 
solidarity in the event of human drama – pandemics, natural disasters and wars.9 
However, this does not mean that solidarity, as it is often done, can be reduced to 
humanitarian help: readiness to support is a part, not the essence, of solidary en-
gagement. The duty to provide assistance is secondary to the dimension of coopera-
tion and civic friendship. The authors of the NCoB report expressed it succinctly: 
solidarity is “the idea that we are all ‘fellow travellers’ and that we have duties to 
support and help each other.”10 Suffering is an inevitable human predicament and 
a fellow traveller often happens to be a fellow sufferer, hence the authors of the 
report add far-sightedly that this mutual help should particularly concern “those 
who cannot readily support themselves.” However, this kind of support settled 
within the frames of cooperation is not provided for its own sake, but for the sake 
of restoring the original symmetry and maintaining social fellowship. “One for all, 
all for one” can mean acting side-by-side or lending a helping hand, according to 
the nature of the social relation and actual capabilities of our partner. 
Cooperation and compassionate support are thus two twin (though differ-
ing) dimensions of the same concern for social fellowship. Such an account corre-
sponds to that of R. Jaeggi11 who depicts solidarity as non-instrumental coopera-
tion. This non-instrumentality has a double sense. Firstly, it expresses a wider 
concept of the good that reaches beyond self-interest and is produced in the course 
of cooperation. However, this common good should not be understood in the 
communal way, but in a creative way – it should not annihilate but transcend its 
                                                 
8 Rizzolatti et al. [2004]. 
9 Cf. Dawson, Verweij [2012]. 
10 NCoB [2011] p. XXIV. 
11 Jaeggi [2001]. 
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self-interest. R. Titmuss12 and the theorists of social capital prove not only that it is 
possible, but, more importantly, that such a non-instrumental commitment that 
is not oriented at individual material gains can bring surprisingly abundant mate-
rial (and immaterial) outcomes for everyone. Furthermore, it expresses the intrin-
sic value of the process of cooperation. Thus, acting together, sharing ideas, caring 
for each other can be rewarding in itself in the same way as is, for example, play-
ing sports or making music in a group. Once again, this qualitative and irreducible 
“joy” of acting together should not be understood as a mechanism of “com-
munalization” and a deterrent to individual action. Solidarity, as supportive coop-
eration, is not a concession for undifferentiated commonality, but an obligation to 
seek civic fellowship despite all the differences, divisions and dispersions – accept-
ing this challenge requires a strong sense of personhood and individual responsi-
bility. 
III. Solidarity and the welfare state 
Solidarity, emerging originally from the Roman institution of obligatio in 
solidum, is inherently connected with legal institutions. The authors of the “Justice 
and solidarity in priority setting in health care” report write:  
Solidarity can be understood as the willingness of people to give governments 
powers in developing and organizing welfare programmes of all kinds. As such, it 
is a government-oriented approach, rather than a market-driven perspective on 
healthcare.13  
This way of thinking about solidarity is not uncommon. Is solidarity indeed 
“state-given?” Historically, as K. Bayertz interestingly notices, the Bismarck legis-
lation, which introduced the world’s first welfare state, was rather “a concession 
which had to be made in the interest of stabilizing society”14 than a commitment to 
solidarity, risk-sharing or charity. Does such a contingent relation justify the re-
duction of solidarity to welfare state arrangements? 
1. PARADOXES OF SOLIDARISM 
“Solidarism” can be understood as a synonym of welfarism. Its main prob-
lems are parallel to those of the classic welfare state: expanded bureaucracy, a de-
manding attitude of citizens and general social inertia, whereas its differentia speci-
                                                 
12 Titmuss [1970]. 
13 Bogaert et al. [2013] p. 89. 
14 Bayertz [1999] p. 24. 
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fica is the post-communist ideology of “acquired rights” in terms of welfare and 
state protection. Much has been written on the destructive consequences of welfa-
rism/solidarism so far, therefore I would like to cast some light on their para-
doxes. These are not “paradoxes” in the sense of logic, but rather psychology: they 
result from the maladjustment of social institutions to human reality, rendering 
solidary efforts Sisyphean. 
First and foremost, there is the paradox of humiliation. The welfare state 
originates, inter alia, from the noble idea of curtailing the embarrassment of private 
benevolence. The anonymous help of state officials seemed less humiliating than 
that offered face-to-face, which tends to invoke the master-slave emotions of pity 
and dependency. However, the anonymity of support, which was supposed to 
prevent humiliation, deepened it instead. The essence of humiliation, according 
to A. Margalit,15 consists in treating human beings as nonhumans – one of the 
modern ways of doing this is treating them as numbers, application forms or 
cases, which, obviously, is a common practice of welfare bureaucracy. It is worth 
noticing that this “dehumanization,” intended to reduce negative emotions, does 
disservice, since feelings, also the unpleasant ones, are the most powerful catalyst 
of change. 
The second paradox can be called a “Hobbesian” one. It is a paradox of an-
thropological pessimism, which leads to the devastating asymmetry between citi-
zens and the government. The classic counterargument is quis custodiet ipsos custo-
des? (Who will guard the guards themselves?) This succinct question reveals the 
shortages of radical anthropological pessimism, as it has either to presuppose that 
state officials are a superior race, which is counterfactual, or create a mechanism of 
meta-control, which continues ad infinitum.16 In both cases, this fuels an excessive 
expansion of Leviathan and thus not only widens the gap between the beneficiar-
ies (ordinary people) and the benefactors (a powerful state), but also infantilizes 
the former by not allowing them to take responsibility for their own lives. A recent 
rhetoric of empowerment17 does not change much in that respect, as it may be re-
garded as another paternalistic transfer, effected at the government’s will, instead 
of a sovereign, civic space where freedom (and thus solidarity) could flourish. 
Over two thousand years ago, Aristotle noticed the paradoxical nature of 
virtue: it is neither natural nor learnt. It is impossible to capture the moment of its 
naissance as it originates from a phenomenon highly questioned nowadays: free 
                                                 
15 Margalit [1996]. 
16 Buchanan [1975]. 
17 Cf. Alsop et al. [2006]. 
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will. This ancient truth reveals the third paradox: virtue cannot appear under du-
ress, which means that enforced charity, instead of liberating, enslaves. B. Frey is 
right in stating that “constitutions for knaves crowd out civic virtues.”18 Regarding 
citizens as immature, idle and corrupted creatures is a self-fulfilling prophecy. To 
make matters worse, empirical research proves that the phenomenon of crowding 
out refers not only to the ability of self-help (via inducing learned helplessness19 
and breeding a culture of complaints) but also to the help provided by others in 
the form of private, voluntary benevolence.20 The phenomenon of crowding out 
has far-reaching social and economic consequences: cross-cultural studies by 
D. Fetchenhauer and R. Wittek showed the following rule: the fewer people in 
a given country adhere to the patriarchal educational style (which strongly focuses 
on authority and obedience), the more honest and solidary the inhabitants of this 
country are, which leads to a greater economic prosperity, economic equality and 
a higher level of urbanization.21 
K. Schuyt made an interesting observation: solidarism, described by him 
suggestively as “administrative solidarity,”22 is unable to distinguish the indi-
viduals who really need support from those who dishonestly overuse it. The same 
problem had already been experienced by 18th-century officials implementing the 
English Poor Laws. They ‘resolved’ it by resorting to humiliation: help was pro-
vided under such dehumanizing conditions that, as it was wrongly assumed, only 
people in the worst misery (the so-called rouge poor) could stoop to ask for it.23 
Such ungrateful practices not only reinforce the aforementioned paradox of hu-
miliation, but also create a new one – the paradox of blindness. Solidarity arising 
from ‘civic friendship’, like every form of friendship, should remain sensitive to 
the personal position. However, its welfarist version, being reduced to an adminis-
trative system of resources transition, makes itself unable to fulfil this role. Distin-
guishing those who really need social assistance from those who can do without it 
requires a lot of personal attention, wisdom and experience that cannot be ob-
tained through a complex system of application forms. 
In conclusion, one may say that solidarism turns out to be futile on both 
levels. On the primary, “cooperative” level, it crowds out entrepreneurship and 
                                                 
18 Frey [1997]. 
19 Dixon, Frolova [2011]. 
20 Pepall et al. [2006]. 
21 Fetchenhauer, Wittek [2006]. 
22 Schuyt [1998] p. 300–301. 
23 A suggestive illustration of these practices can be found in Tocqueville’s “Memoir on pauper-
ism” – Tocqueville [1997]. 
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destroys spontaneous fellowship by constant and systematic humiliation and 
state-dependency; on the second, “supportive” level, it is doomed to fail from 
the very beginning due to administrative insensitivity to individual needs and 
problems. 
IV. Solidarity in the legal framework 
The conclusions from the previous section do not seem very optimistic. 
They can be treated as another argument in favour of privatization of solidarity: If 
the state’s mediation crowds out solidarity, should it not be left in the shadows of 
the personal sphere, latent in an expectancy of a miracle of social cohesion, emerg-
ing spontaneously out of individual moral decisions? Such a conclusion is based 
on two assumptions: 1) reduction of solidarity to charity, 2) consent to implemen-
tation of solidarity by the state. However, solidarity, as it has already been said, 
cannot be identified with mere charity, and a fortiori with its enforced state version 
described as solidarism. Therefore, the critics of the latter do not prejudge the dis-
crepancy between solidarity and law. It should rather be treated as an admonition 
against excessive and too strict legalism and an invitation to the quest for legal 
arrangements more subtle than the welfarist ones. To clarify the concept and the 
role of solidarity within the legal frames, solidarity must be confronted with other 
social concepts: decency, justice, freedom and equality (to mention only the prin-
cipal ones). In the following section, I will focus on the first two of these notions. 
1. THE CONCEPT OF DECENCY AND THE LIMITS OF THE STATE 
The concept of decency should be treated as a touchstone for the adequacy 
of legal arrangements. First of all, it was paternalism and coerciveness of the state 
that rendered solidarism futile. Decency, in the understanding of A. Margalit,24 is 
the most fundamental social concept, which refers precisely to this problematic 
issue – the way institutions treat people – and obligates the state to leave a vast 
spectrum for individual freedom. As such, it can serve as a means of protection 
against the expansion of Leviathan. 
Decency is the most fundamental concept because it expresses the ultimate 
value of self-respect. According to Margalit, self-respect stands in the most inti-
mate relation with our humanity. Self-respect does not refer to our achievements, 
deeds and other external efforts (these fall under the concept of self-esteem), but to 
our intrinsic value as humans, to our human dignity. As such, it is a precondition 
of personal development and good life. All coercive (from authoritarian to totali-
                                                 
24 Margalit [1996]. 
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tarian) societies that treat individuals as anonymous, insignificant elements of 
a faceless mass, as “cogs in the machine,” violate this irreducible value of human 
individuality and the mystery of their personal freedom. Therefore, rational peo-
ple who want to create a just society must avoid creating humiliating institutions 
and social conditions. 
Humiliation must be avoided as a contradiction of decency. Margalit opera-
tionalizes this concept on three levels: humiliation consists in 1) treating human 
beings as if they were not humans – as beasts, machines or sub-humans; 2) per-
forming actions that manifest or lead to loss of basic control; 3) rejecting a human 
being from the “Family of Man.” Solidarism practices indecency on each of these 
levels: 1) it downgrades human beings to application forms and cases; 2) it trades 
freedom and enterprise for the panem et circenses of welfare arrangements; 3) it 
treats state officials as a more powerful ‘superior race’ and is marked by a substan-
tial mistrust of citizens’ free and sovereign action. This last point is worth empha-
sizing. Human dignity (which can be treated as a synonym of self-respect) is ex-
pressed in free action (it is not by accident that the Polish and German Constitu-
tions proclaim that human dignity is a source of human rights and freedoms). 
Therefore, as Margalit states, the spectrum of free human action must be carefully 
protected and thus, on the political level, freedom from interference gains preva-
lence over freedom to achieve a good life. Freedom from interference, as seen by 
Margalit, protects us from subjugating our decisions to the illegitimate will (even 
if goodwill) of another and as such protects us from humiliation.25 
The concepts of decency and solidarity are intertwined. This correlation is 
a historical fact: from the lofty French slogan to the Polish anti-communist revolu-
tion, solidarity has always been emerging in a common struggle for freedom from 
oppression and humane, decent treatment. The common point for both of these 
concepts is the passion for human freedom, which can be presented on the exam-
ple of Rorty’s26 concept of solidarity. His dedication to freedom gives rise to the 
concept of “negative solidarity.” Traditionally, solidarity has been based on 
the recognition of sameness. As a postmodernist, committed to contingency, 
nominalism and radical difference, Rorty denies the possibility of finding a basis 
for universal sameness based on pure reason, language or “core self,” as well as all 
the particular concepts of sameness (race, nationality, gender etc.), which are po-
tential tools for exclusion (“a Greek like ourselves”). His way of thinking is over-
whelmed by a liberal fear of cruelty (appearing also in the disguise of paternalism) 
                                                 
25 Margalit [1997]. 
26 Rorty [1989]. 
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and thus he founds his account of solidarity on a negative premise, that is, on the 
protest against physical and mental cruelty, with the latter consisting in the pain 
of humiliation. In his opinion, solidarity does not require a complex theory of 
sameness, but the most basic, human sensitivity for others’ pain. 
Rorty’s account of solidarity is abridged and so modest that it turns out to 
be the same idea that Margalit understands under the notion of “decency.” Both 
concepts express a fundamental commitment to respect and sensitivity for other 
human beings, which is Kantian in its provenience. They are thoroughly liberal 
concepts, negative in their consequences: aimed against cruelty, humiliation and 
coercion, they demand one vast spectrum of freedom for another. In its full- 
-blooded version, solidarity is intrinsically a positive notion. Although it can 
emerge in the course of a common struggle for decency, its definition includes 
much more than mere sensitivity and compassion. Decency guarantees due re-
spect of our differences and a decent margin of freedom for one another; while 
solidarity goes further and invites us to treat these differences in a creative, more 
cooperative way. However, it does not mean that it abandons its passion for free-
dom. Liberal warnings against cruelty have to be treated most seriously. Without 
the core of decency, “solidary” groupings easily change into mafia, terrorist, or 
even totalitarian organizations27 or – in the best case – into welfare arrangements, 
which admittedly have noble goals, but attempt to achieve them with less noble 
means. A solidary organization which does not respect the core of a liberal state – 
its commitment to decency – must in the long run prove to be destructive, as it 
violates the most primary good: self-respect. It is decency and potential inclusive-
ness of solidary association that determine its moral quality. On a state scale, de-
cency is a guard of the liberal limits of state. 
2. SOLIDARITY AND JUSTICE 
The relation between solidarity and justice is even closer than that between 
solidarity and decency. On the one hand, both notions are often described as con-
tradictory. It is said that justice belongs to the domain of rights and duties, while 
solidarity refers rather to the personal sphere. Solidarity and justice do conflict. 
Justice demands acting under the veil of ignorance, while solidarity must remain 
sensitive to the complexities of personal position. More than a rule, solidarity is 
a moral and social attitude. The traditional image of blindfolded justice, when con-
trasted with vulnerable solidarity, is very illustrative. The same idea is expressed 
through many subtle distinctions – the Hegelian conflict between Moralität and 
                                                 
27 Cf. Banfield [1958]. 
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Sittlichkeit (as evoked by R. ter Meulen), F. Tönnies’ famous distinction between 
Gessellschaft and Gemeinschaft (used by Weber in his theory of associative relation-
ship – Vergesselschaftung) versus communal relationship – Vergemeinschaftung and 
many parallel ones. The fundamental idea behind all these images is that justice 
refers to abstract (“cold”) rights and duties, while solidarity refers to the personal 
relations of mutual commitment, responsibility and recognition (e.g. A. Honneth28 
identifies solidarity with the last of these concepts). 
On the other hand, however, solidarity and justice are said to be two sides 
of the same coin.29 J. Waldron offers an interesting variation of the Good Samari-
tan story: what would happen, he asks, if the injured man, instead of being helped 
by the Samaritan, was vigorous enough to find his way to a log cabin privately 
owned by the priest or the Levite and warmed his hands by the fire?30 Would we 
take it for trespassing and prohibit it, or, to the contrary, would we obligate the 
merciless owners to provide this passive, low-cost support? A similar question 
arises from the writings of a Polish philosopher, Z. Stawrowski:31 do we, in the 
classical biblical story, consider the priest and the Levite, despite their lack of soli-
darity, still just, or do they prove their injustice through their cold-heartedness? 
Obviously, solidarity cannot be reduced to charity, but these reflections prove that 
the borders between the two realms, described above as contrasting (the realm of 
personal commitment versus that of abstract rules), are in fact flexible and mov-
able. A valuable contribution to this debate was made by A. Buchanan.32 He ana-
lysed traditional distinctions between the duties of justice and the duties of charity 
(the former, unlike the latter, being: 1) exclusively negative, 2) enforceable, 3) per-
fect and 4) a matter of rights) and described their flexible and mutually influential 
nature, which led to the far-reaching institutionalization of the duties of charity. 
Maybe Saint Thomas was right and charity is a superior form of justice? What 
should lawyers think of it? 
In the quest for determination of the mutual relations between different so-
cial concepts, once again, a very illustrative lesson has been given by A. Margalit. 
He distinguishes two levels of social bonds: personal and institutional. On the per-
sonal level, a counterpart of the idea of decency is the concept of a “civilized” so-
ciety. Decency is originally a macro-ethical, social concept, though still a very ba-
                                                 
28 Honneth [1996]. 
29 Habermas [1985]. 
30 Waldron [1993]. 
31 Stawrowski [2014]. 
32 Buchanan [1987]. 
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sic, pre-modern one. As Margalit (controversially) assumes, a decent society does 
not require a clear concept of rights. In his opinion, the duty-based society of 
18th-century Prussia could be a decent society as long as it forbade humiliation (it 
is worth noticing that this could serve as another interesting contribution to the 
criticism of welfare and its hypertrophy of social guarantees). Despite its pre-
modern nature, decency arises on the verge between the private and the public 
spheres and it refers to the relation between institutions and citizens, whereas 
a civilized society describes the way people treat one another, For example, in the 
view of the author, the Czech (respectively: Polish) society under the communist 
regime was indecent, but still could be (and in many aspects indeed was) a civi-
lized society. On the institutional level, Margalit, in addition to a decent society, 
introduces the additional concepts of a “bridled” society and a just society. A soci-
ety whose institutions do not torture its citizens is a bridled society, a society 
whose institutions do not humiliate its citizens is a decent society, and, finally, 
a society whose institutions deploy a fair pattern and procedure of distribution of 
primary goods is a just society. The relation between these three types of societies 
is inclusive – a just society must also be a decent one and a decent society must 
also be a bridled one, but not the other way round. 
On a graphic spectrum of societal development, a solidary society is further 
than a merely just one. Decency is concerned with the most primary good of self- 
-respect, which is inherent to every human being, justice – with the distribution of 
all the divisible (material as well as immaterial) goods, and solidarity expresses 
a moral and social attitude towards achieving and providing these goods: it treats 
these processes (as well as their outcomes) as parts of a common enterprise (com-
mon good). Solidarity as civic friendship goes further than decency with its obliga-
tion to respect the most basic quality of social relations (between individuals de-
scribed as merely “civilized”) and further than justice with its commitment to fair 
and, in a more or less sublime sense, equal relations: solidary care about the qual-
ity of social bonds reaches extremes in the metaphor of fraternity. A solidary soci-
ety would attain the highest level of social development – one where people, in 
respect of their and other humans’ dignity and personal freedom, reserving due 
distance, not only share resources fairly, but also take up the challenge of mutual 
responsibility (“one for all, all for one”) and, if necessary, are willing to sacrifice 
a part of their fair share for the sake of others. Like in Margalit’s schema, the rela-
tion between these “ideal types” of societies is inclusive: a just society cannot be 
built without due respect to the primary Kantian concern for human dignity, and 
a solidary society – without its due commitment to both justice and decency. 
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Furthermore, solidarity has two dimensions: personal and institutional. At 
the personal level, it is aimed at achieving the highest quality of social relations, 
which should be based on cooperation, responsibility, mutual support and trust, 
and thus promote social cohesion and operative unity (‘acting together as one” as 
opposed to “fluidarity”33). At the institutional level, due to its close connection 
with justice, solidarity affects patterns and procedures of distribution: as regards 
material dimension of justice, solidarity means a concession to “social” correction 
of the abstract rules; regarding the procedural aspect, it expresses a commitment 
to the most cooperative (or “deliberative” in Habermasian terms) way of doing it. 
Briefly speaking, at the institutional level, solidarity can be understood as a form 
of social justice. This sociality, however, cannot be extended too far. The commit-
ment to the idea of decency obligates us to keep the state within rational limits. 
Therefore, a distinction should be made between the two contents of solidarity: the 
minimum and the maximum one, of which only the former can be institutional-
ized and enforced by the means of coercion. 
a) Minimum content of solidarity – social justice 
Undoubtedly, the concept of solidarity as a form of social justice is not new. 
The novum of this decent version, however, is its commitment to restricted limits 
of state – the aforementioned “minimality.” Social “solidary” justice cannot lead to 
welfarist arrangements. Traditionally, in the special sphere of justice – justice in 
health care – solidarity has been identified with an imperative to “help the suffer-
ing, the troubled and the disadvantaged”34 and as such has had three traditional 
dimensions: 1) income solidarity, 2) age solidarity and 3) risk solidarity. This re-
veals the logic of solidarity, which consists in breaching the perfect ignorance of 
justice for the sake of improvement of the situation of particular (worst-off) sub-
jects or groups of subjects. Solidarity as a mechanism of introducing exceptions 
has to reflect the criteria of justice, otherwise the support provided to the worst-off 
may become a bottomless pit. 
We cannot thus follow the vast path traced by B. Prainsack and A. Buyx.35 
The authors proposed a very interesting account of solidarity, which captures its 
interpersonal-institutional dynamic. In its bare-bones version, it depicts solidarity 
as a “manifestation of the willingness to carry costs to assist others with whom 
a person recognises sameness or similarity in at least one relevant respect”36 which 
                                                 
33 Cf. Lukes [1999]. 
34 Kornai et al. [2001] p. 17. 
35 Buyx, Prainsack [2011]. 
36 Ibidem, p. 47. 
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is then re-forged into norms of “good group conduct” and legal arrangements. 
Despite many assets of this promising theory (including a suggestive description 
of the process of “institutionalization” of solidarity), it is – wrongly – used to out-
weigh the value of individual responsibility.37 The core of the problem concerns 
the process of recognizing similarity as a derivative of the context of the practices 
one engages oneself in. As such, it is contingent and arbitrary, which is addition-
ally reinforced in the appeal to “imaginary” communities.38 For example, accord-
ing to the authors, the lack of such “imaginary” recognition is the main reason for 
refusing support to “the imprudent” (smokers, people who overuse alcohol or 
fatty foods, etc.), raised by “the prudent” in the discussion concerning the so- 
-called lifestyle diseases (which entails the deeper question of “fairness” of ration-
ing health care resources by individual responsibility). Although it cannot be de-
nied that imagination (operating through powerful media images) plays a huge 
role in creating communities of risk, the above distinction between “the prudent 
and the imprudent” results from criteria deeper than only imagination-related. It 
reflects our basic moral intuition referring to the essence of justice, which more or 
less directly deploys the category of desert (e.g. as in Dworkin’s opposition be-
tween brute luck and option luck39). As the authors of “Justice and solidarity in 
priority setting in healthcare” argue convincingly:  
People do tend to feel and think differently about […] the smoker having a heart 
attack who is seriously overweight and the 60-year-old man who has always taken 
excellent care of himself and is suddenly stricken by leukaemia. Furthermore, 
cases like the one of the leukaemia patient who has always taken excellent care of 
himself raise reactions such as: “This is undeserved!”40 
In conclusion, it may be said that solidarity in it its minimum version must 
respect two principles: 1) if it is not to be confused with potentially endless hu-
manitarian aid, it must reflect rational criteria of justice; 2) solidarity cannot be 
understood in opposition to individual responsibility – on the contrary, both indi-
vidual and social versions of responsibility are two integral dimensions of the 
same moral and social attitude towards oneself and other people. Not accidentally, 
these two concepts – solidarity and individual responsibility (Solidarität und Eigen-
verantwortung) – are taken together in the fundamental § 1 of the German Sozial-
                                                 
37 Buyx [2008]; Prainsack [2013]. 
38 Anderson [1991]. 
39 Dworkin [2000]. 
40 Bogaert et al. [2013] p. 101. 
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gesetzbuch (V). Responsibility can be understood as a logical extension of an indi-
vidual’s free action, and as such it sets the limits for social assistance, establishing 
priority for those who are unable to undertake such an action (the so-called unde-
servedly deprived41), as well as the goals of such an assistance, which should be 
provided not for the sake of arbitrary charity but for the sake of social inclusion 
and cooperation (as far as possible). The account of social justice that respects in-
dividual freedom and responsibility allows for the keeping of potentially endless 
support and thus the frames of state within the rational (decent) limits. 
b) The maximum content of solidarity – a regulative ideal 
The maximum content of solidarity, which is aimed at promoting trustful, 
cooperative relations between individuals, cannot be enforced with the use of co-
ercive power. It does not mean, however, that it must be left totally outside the 
legal frames. Law not only deters and coerces, but, most importantly, coordinates 
and educates. According to I. Bohnet,42 the latter is more significant than the for-
mer. This can be achieved indirectly, and through a different kind of law, the “soft 
law,” i.e. legal means that provide for no or for very small sanctions and include 
general clauses or wide-ranging directions. The asset of imperfect regulations is 
that they allow for extensive interpretation and leave a vast margin of freedom. 
The best explanation of the value of this imperfect, soft legislation will 
probably be the classic Kantian one. In his view, perfect and imperfect duties ex-
press logical and, respectively, pragmatic impossibility to generalize contrary 
principles. The “inner morality of legislation,” its intrinsic “dignity”43 consists in 
a movement of generalization which expresses a general concern for others, 
a moral attempt to compromise different, and frequently conflicting, interests of 
individuals. One of the most prominent examples of this expressive (or in Kantian 
terms: regulative) function of law may be the dignity clause in the Polish Constitu-
tion (modelled on the German Constitution), as already mentioned above. Al-
though both of these legal acts proclaim that human dignity “shall be inviolable” 
and declare “the duty of all state authority” to protect it, none of them predicts 
any sanctions for possible violations. Despite that, the dignity clause serves as 
a tertium comparationis for conflicting human rights or as a meta-principle of inter-
pretation and its significant influence on the legal order remains undeniable. 
A solidary society in its maximum version should be treated precisely as 
such a regulative ideal. This ideal can be approached in various manners, begin-
                                                 
41 Brock [2002]. 
42 Bohnet [2003]. 
43 Waldron [1990]. 
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ning from fostering, promoting and facilitating a culture of responsibility for one 
another (it is worth noticing here that, despite all the national differences with re-
spect to the extent of Samaritan help that could be legally demanded, it can never 
be denied when a prior relation of responsibility exists44). R. ter Meulen’s oeuvre 
indicates the directions of development of solidarity-inducing practice in health 
care. One example of such practices is family care45 (caregiving for a family mem-
ber who has become dependent because of disease or illness), which gives rise to 
informal solidarity based on personal relations and free choice. Undoubtedly, the 
provision of such informal care can be facilitated by legal arrangements and fos-
tered by financial incentives.46 As such, it contributes not only to the reduction of 
welfare institutions, but, primarily, to the creation of a culture of cooperation and 
responsibility. 
Nevertheless, the scheme presented above is only a general one, its main 
concern was to expose the value of legal framing, which can channel spontaneous 
human action and direct it on the way to a solidary society. The catalogue of 
“solidary practices” is yet to be found and elaborated on. 
V. Conclusions 
Perhaps the main conclusion lies in Aristotle’s view of moderation as the 
highest virtue, which turns out to be valid also in the legal world. Reflective equi-
librium between the principles and strategies emerging from different realms of 
social life must therefore be sought in the most modest (decent) way. Since the 
quest for a solidary society arises from the passion for human freedom and an ef-
fort to construe a public sphere that will not be a reservoir of oppression, such 
a research should begin with a solid reflection on human nature. Only “human-
tailored” law can prevent pragmatic “paradoxes” which, via moralistic fallacy and 
prescriptive inflation, render legal means ineffective. A solidary society cannot 
demand heroism or enforce charity, and thereby it expresses its fundamental 
commitment to individual self-respect and freedom. Rights, however, can still be 
treated seriously and their creative, “regulative” potential can be used with (and 
for the sake of) decent care. 
                                                 
44 Smits [2000]. 
45 ter Meulen, Wright [2012]. 
46 Cf. Triantafillou et al. [2010]. 
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